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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

STATE COURTS
ALASKA
Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that an Alaskan statute permitted recovery of damages for the
municipalities' diverted-services claims for services diverted due to cleanup
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
This suit arose from the March 1989 spill of eleven million gallons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound. As a result of the spill, the
surrounding municipalities had to divert employee resources from their
normal services to the massive cleanup operation. The Cities of Seward,
Cordova, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Lions, and Larsen Bay ("Cities")
sued the parent corporation of the oil tanker, Exxon Corporation
("Exxon"), for costs of municipal services associated with diverting the
resources to the clean up.
The Cities sued under Alaska statute 46.03.822(a), which imposed
strict liability for harm caused by release of hazardous waste. The statute
provided for recovery for a variety of damages associated with an oil spill
including, but not limited to, additional costs of services in cleaning up the
spill as well as costs due to delayed function or activity because the
municipality or state was involved in a clean up. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Exxon, determining that the Cities' claims for
diverted services were not "damages" covered by the statute. The Cities
appealed and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed.
Exxon presented four arguments: (1) the "free public services
doctrine" barred any claims for damages by the Cities; (2) the Cities
waived any right to claim these damages due to a prior settlement
agreement; (3) the Cities lacked standing; and (4) Federal Maritime law
preempted the Cities' claims.
The free public services doctrine stated that the public had to bear the
cost of emergency public services, thereby relieving individual tortfeasors
from liability. The court addressed the issue by stating that even assuming
the doctrine applied, the statutes abrogated the doctrine regarding the
municipal recovery for spill-related damages.
The court relied on the specific language of the statute. It pointed out
that the broadness of the language indicated the legislature's intent to
provide compensation for governmental services, even if not recoverable at
common law. The court found particularly compelling that the statute
allowed for strict liability "not withstanding any other provision or rule of
law." The court also held that diverted services fell within the types of
damages allowed under the Alaska statute. The court recognized that there
existed some room for confusion because of a series of amendments to
statute sections 46.03.822 and .844. The court reviewed the legislative
history and determined that the legislature's definition of "damages" and
"loss of economic benefit" were broad and intended to include diverted
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services costs. The court held that the trial court's interpretation of
46.03.822 was too narrow. The court qualified its holding by reiterating
that the burden still lay on the Cities to show actual damages under
46.03.822 and .844.
Exxon contended that even if the damages applied, the Cities waived
their right to the diverted services claims due to a prior settlement
agreement. The court held that since the Cities had reserved the right to
appeal, the Cities had not waived the right.
Exxon next argued that the Cities did not have standing to bring the
claims because the right belonged to the citizens themselves. In response,
the court stated that the plain language of the statute conferred standing to
the Cities; the statute defined damages incurred by "a state, a municipality,
or a village."
Exxon contended that even if the Alaskan statutes allowed the diverted
services claims, federal maritime laws preempted them. Exxon relied on a
case that stated that recovery for purely economic loss without physical
injury was not allowed under federal maritime law.
The court used a two-part test to determine if federal law preempted
the Alaskan statute. First, the court looked to see if the statute worked a
"material prejudice to a 'characteristic feature' of the maritime law." The
court defined "characteristic feature" as one that "originated" or "has
exclusive application" in admiralty. The court cited a case that held that
merely because a purely economic claim arose out of admiralty did not
mean the claim was immediately preempted.
In applying the second part of the test, the court addressed whether the
state statute "interfere[d] with the proper 'harmony and uniformity' of
maritime law." To determine this, the court applied a balancing test of the
federal and the state interests in the subject matter. Here, the court agreed
with the Cities that the state had a legitimate and strong interest in
regulating oil pollution of its waters. The court recognized that imposing
liability might have had some influence on maritime commerce, but that
the state interest was strong enough to defeat preemption. Further, the
court noted a diminishment of the federal interests over the years,
evidenced by recent regulations such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act that allowed, to some extent, liability for purely
economic loss. The court held that the Alaskan statutes did not interfere
with the federal maritime laws, and thus were not preempted.
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